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Abstract: Network slicing is gaining an increasing importance as an effective way to introduce
flexibility in the management of resources in 5G networks. We envision a scenario where a set of
network operators outsource their respective networks to one Infrastructure Provider (InP), and use
network slicing mechanisms to request the resources as needed for service provision. The InP is then
responsible for the network operation and maintenance, while the network operators become Virtual
Network Operators (VNOs). We model a setting where two VNOs compete for the users in terms of
quality of service, by strategically distributing its share of the aggregated cells capacity managed by
the InP among its subscribers. The results show that the rate is allocated among the subscribers at
each cell in a way that mimics the overall share that each VNO is entitled to, and that this allocation
is the Nash equilibrium of the strategic slicing game between the VNOs. We conclude that network
sharing and slicing provide an attractive flexibility in the allocation of resources without the need to
enforce a policy through the InP.
Keywords: network slicing; service competition; rate allocation; virtual network operators
1. Introduction
The current mobile network architecture uses a relatively monolithic access and transport
framework to accommodate a variety of services such as mobile traffic for smart phones,
OTT (Over-The-Top) content, feature phones, data cards, and embedded M2M devices. It is anticipated
that this architecture will not be flexible and scalable enough to support the coming 5G network,
which demands very diverse use cases and sometimes extreme requirements—in terms of performance,
scalability and availability. Furthermore, the introduction of new network services should me made
more efficiently [1].
In the above scenario, network slicing is gaining an increasing importance as an effective way
to introduce flexibility in the management of network resources. A network slice is a collection of
network resources, selected in order to satisfy the requirements—e.g., in terms of performance—of
the service(s) to be provided by the slice. An enabling aspect of network slicing is virtualization.
Virtualization of network resources allows operators to share the same physical resource in a flexible
and dynamic manner in order to exploit the available resources in a more efficient way [2].
Within the above context, we envision a scenario where a set of network operators outsource
their respective networks to one Infrastructure Provider (InP), and use network slicing mechanisms
to request the resources as needed for service provision. The InP is then responsible for the network
operation and maintenance, while the network operators become Virtual Network Operators (VNOs),
since they no longer own the network infrastructure but request them from the InP. We can also envision
other emergent players becoming VNOs, e.g., OTT service providers. Even Vertical Industry players
may take this role, when needing connectivity services for their sensors or their smart vehicles [3,4].
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We propose a business model where the VNOs provide service to end users. This service may be
characterized by a series of performance constraints, e.g., transmission rate. In addition, each VNO
gets revenues from its subscribers. To support the service, the VNOs request dynamically access and
core network resources from an InP. The InP may charge a price for each requested resource, setup a
long-term contract with each VNO or just work as a supporting unit to the VNOs.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• A business model for VNOs is proposed, where the resources are outsourced to an InP and
supplied to the VNOs through network slicing.
• A game theory-based analysis of the competition between the VNOs that implement such business
model is performed.
• The Nash equilibrium of such competition game is calculated and it is shown that results in a
resource allocation that matches the entitlement or contribution of each VNO.
The analysis applies concepts from microeconomics and from discrete-choice analysis in modeling
the users. Game theory is thoroughly used in the paper and specifically in modeling and analyzing the
competition between the VNOs.
Related Work
Game theory is a well-known discipline from mathematics, and its application to the modeling
and analysis of the interactions in microeconomics is long-standing [5]. There is, however, a relatively
recent trend in computer networks engineering to incorporate game theory-based models in order
to take into account either the selfish behavior of the devices (terminals, servers) or the economic
incentives of the agents (users, providers). Our work belongs to this trend, and it shares this feature
with the works referred below.
Specifically, many recent works apply game theory to the analysis of service provision
in a competitive environment, within the context of telecommunications or internet-related
services. For example, references [6–9] analyze the provision of mobile communication services
in cognitive radio and femtocell contexts, where the resource supporting the service is the spectrum.
References [10,11] analyze the provision of sensing data-based services, where the data is supplied
by wireless sensor networks. References [12–14] analyze the provision of cloud services, where the
supporting resources are computation and storage. In all of the above works, the service providers
intermediate between the resource providers and the users, which is also the role played by the VNOs
in our work. However, our work departs from these works in that the resources supplied by the InP
are typically distributed geographically; in other words, the service received by a user can only be
supported by the resources available in the vicinity of the user, not by the entirety of the resource pool.
There are only a few works, however, that model the economic relationships that emerge in
network slicing-based resource allocation within the context of 5G. References [15–17] analyze the
global profit maximization problem of a set of independent Mobile VNOs that request slices from an
Mobile Network Operator (MNO), and propose several allocation mechanisms for solving this system
optimization problem. Our work departs from these works in that the MNO decides and executes the
complete allocation to all users in a centralized manner, while the VNOs in our work participate in the
allocation decision.
Finally, our work closely relates to the work in [18,19], which propose optimal resource allocation
mechanisms within the context of 5G network slicing and geographically distributed resources.
In these two works and ours, the allocation is of a distributed nature, that is, the VNOs are involved in
the allocation—as opposed to a centralized scheme. Specifically, our work is inspired by the proposal
in [18]. However, our work differs importantly from these two works in that we model the VNOs and
the users as different agents with their particular incentives, which are the profits and the user utility,
respectively. In [18,19], each VNO operates as a proxy of its subscribers; this may fail to properly model
the VNO’s incentives and the corresponding business model. This difference has also an important
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implication in the user behaviour modelling: while in our work the number of subscribers for each
VNO depends on the VNOs allocation decision, in [18,19], it is independent from it, since the number
of subscribers is fixed a priori as a parameter.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the model for the VNOs, the users, and the
InP is described. In Section 3, a strategic game is presented for the interaction between the VNOs
and the Nash equilibrium for the game is formulated. In Section 4, the resulting resource allocation,
subscribers and profit distribution at the equilibrium are discussed. In addition, finally, Section 5
draws the conclusions.
2. Model
In this section, we propose a model amenable for the analysis of the service provision by VNOs,
within a network slicing framework.
2.1. System Model
A network consists of a set of resources B managed by an InP and leased by a set S of VNOs
(or equivalently, network slices). We focus on mobile service operators and, specifically, on the radio
access network, so that the resources may be the data rate available in a cell.
The resources leased by the VNOs are used to deliver service to a set U of users. We define the
following subsets of users: U (r) (the users at cell r), Us (VNO s’s subscribers), and U (r)s (the intersection).
Each VNO s is entitled to a share hs of the total amount of resources available in the network,
such that∑s∈S hs = 1. This share was agreed when the operators pooled their networks and outsourced
their operation to the InP and will then be proportional to the total amount of resources contributed.
The VNO allocates the resource for providing services to its subscribers in the following
way. VNO s distributes its share among its subscribers, assigning a weight ω(r)s to U (r)s , such that
∑r∈B ω
(r)
s = hs. The weight assignment decision is notified to the InP, who proceeds to perform the
actual resource allocation at each individual cell. The resource allocated for the service provision to
each user is the transmission rate. The InP allocates a rate to the set U (r)s given by
R(r)s =
ω
(r)
s
∑t∈S ω
(r)
t
c(r) (1)
where c(r) is cell r capacity.
Please note that in this allocation scheme, VNO s chooses weight ω(r)s for the set of its subscribers
at cell r and the InP performs the actual rate allocation at each individual cell according to (1).
Proceeding in such indirect way, the capacity constraint at each cell is automatically enforced,
i.e., ∑s∈S R
(r)
s = c(r), ∀r ∈ B.
2.2. Economic Model
Each VNO provides service to users based on the resource allocation agreed with the InP,
according to the description made above. Pricing for the service provision consists of a flat-rate
price ps. We assume that variable costs incurred by the VNOs are zero, so that only fixed costs are
incurred. Furthermore, since the fixed costs are not relevant to the weight decision made by the VNOs,
they are not include in the analysis.
We use a discrete-choice model for the modeling of the users’ choices, which is frequently used in
econometrics [20]. Specifically, given a discrete set of options, the utility of a user u ∈ U (r) making the
choice s is assumed to be equal to v(r)s + κu,s: the term v
(r)
s encompasses the objective aspects of option
s and is the same for all users in U (r)s , while κu,s is an unobserved user-specific value that is modeled on
the global level as a random variable. From the distribution of these i.i.d. variables, one can compute
the probability that a user selects option s, and when the user population size is sufficiently large,
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this corresponds to the proportion of users making that choice. In our model, the user choice is the
choice of one of the VNOs in S .
To model the objective part of the users’ utility, each subscriber pays the price ps to VNO s,
and receives service at cell r supported by a rate r(r)s . Following [21], we propose
v(r)s = µ log
(
r(r)s /ps
)
. (2)
Firstly, the higher the rate a subscriber receives, the higher the utility the user derives from the
service. The dependence is logarithmic, as there is an increasing evidence that user experience and
satisfaction in telecommunication scenarios follow logarithmic laws [22]. Secondly, the dependence on
the price is through a negative logarithm, instead; or in other words, the ratio r(r)s /ps is proposed to be
the relevant magnitude for the utility. In addition, thirdly, µ > 0 is a sensitivity parameter.
To model the unobserved user-specific part of the utility, following the literature on discrete-choice
models, we assume that each user-specific random variable κu,s follows a Gumbel distribution of
mean 0 and parameter ν. The choice of the Gumbel distribution allows us to obtain a logistic function,
as shown below.
With the users’ utility modeled as stated above, it can be shown [23] that the fraction of the
number of users n(r)s that subscribe to VNO s over the total number of users n(r) at cell r is
n(r)s
n(r)
=
(r(r)s /ps)α
∑t∈S (r
(r)
t /pt)α
, s ∈ S , (3)
where α = µ/ν is the users’ sensitivity parameter, that is, it models the sensitivity to the
rate-to-price ratio.
Please note that we assume that the users are price-takers, which is a sensible assumption for
a sufficiently high number of users at each cell. The price-taking assumption is commonplace in
microeconomics when the users are small compared to the operators. This allows to assume that the
prices are parameters in the utility-maximization problems faced by the users; or, in other words,
that the user does not anticipate the potential effect of his/her decision in the final price.
As argued in the next section, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the service price is
the same for every VNO, i.e., ps = p, ∀s ∈ S . The number of subscribers is then given by
n(r)s = n(r)
(r(r)s )α
∑t∈S (r
(r)
t )
α
, s ∈ S , r ∈ B. (4)
The rate allocated by the InP to one subscriber of VNO s, assuming that the rate is equally
distributed in U (r)s and taking into account (1), is given by
r(r)s =
R(r)s
n(r)s
=
ω
(r)
s
∑t∈S ω
(r)
t
c(r)
n(r)s
, s ∈ S ; r ∈ B. (5)
Bearing in mind that every user always subscribes to one VNO, i.e.,
∑
s∈S
n(r)s = n(r) r ∈ B, (6)
the number of subscribers can be expressed, replacing (5) in (4) and performing some algebra,
as functions of the weights:
n(r)s = n(r)
(ω
(r)
s )
β
∑t∈S (ω
(r)
t )
β
, s ∈ S , r ∈ B (7)
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where β ≡ αα+1 , which is less than 1.
3. Game Model and Analysis
The revenue of VNO s is equal to the sum of the price paid by each subscriber:
Πs = ps ∑
r∈B
n(r)s = p ∑
r∈B
n(r)s . (8)
Each VNO is assumed to operate in order to maximize its revenues. We will analyze the
competition between the VNOs in terms of quality of service, that is, on how each VNO sets weight
ω
(r)
s at cell r in order to attract the users. We denote the weight vector set by VNO s as ws, with one
component ω(r)s for each r ∈ B. We are assuming that the competition is not in terms of prices. This may
reflect a situation where a regulatory authority has fixed the price. Or either, it may correspond to a
situation where the time frame of the weight setting—hours or days—is much shorter that the time
frame of the price setting—weeks or months.
From (8), it can be inferred that VNO s’s profit depends not only on ws, but also on w−s (−s
refers to all VNOs other than VNO s). This dependence can be made explicit as follows: Πs(ws, w−s).
Moreover, this dependence is strategic, that is, VNO s takes into account not only that Πs depends
on w−s, but also that each competitor t ∈ S\{s} sets wt taking into account that Πt depends on ws.
Game theory provides the theoretical foundation for analyzing this strategic relationship. Specifically,
since each VNO acts in an independent and selfish manner, the appropriate game-theoretical models
are the non-cooperative ones. In such games, the solution concept, that is, the profile of strategies
where each player has no incentive to deviate, is the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium does not
prescribe any iterative algorithm or evolutionary dynamics for arriving to the equilibrium, since it
is an static concept. In our model, the players are the VNOs, the strategies are the weights, and the
incentives are the revenues. To sum up, given w−s, VNO s will choose ws so that
max
ws
Πs(ws, w−s) (9)
subject to ∑
r∈B
ω
(r)
s ≤ hs (10)
ws ∈ R|B|+ , (11)
where Rn+ denotes the positive orthant.
The |S| revenue maximization problems form the strategic game, which we call strategic slicing.
We will model the strategic slicing as a two-stage game, where in the first stage, each VNO sets its
weights and reports its assignment to the InP, as described in Section 2.1, in a simultaneous and
non-cooperative way; and in the second stage, the users subscribe to a VNO, as described in Section 2.2.
We use the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, whereby, at the first stage,
the weights that each VNO chooses at each cell are such that it gets no revenue improvement from
changing the weights assuming that the competitor VNOs do not deviate from the equilibrium weights,
anticipating the subscription decision of the users at the second stage.We will model the strategic
slicing as a one-shot game, where each VNO sets its weights and reports its assignment to the InP,
as described in Section 2.1, in a simultaneous and non-cooperative way. In the Nash equilibrium each
VNO chooses weights at each cell such that it gets no revenue improvement from changing the weights
assuming that the competitor VNOs do not deviate from the equilibrium weights. In the whole game,
the subscription decision of the users is anticipated by the VNOs.
We undertake the analysis of the case of two VNOs, referred hereafter as a and b, so that (7)
simplifies to
n(r)s = n(r)
(ω
(r)
s )
β
(ω
(r)
a )β + (ω
(r)
b )
β
, s = a, b; r ∈ B (12)
Electronics 2018, 7, 315 6 of 10
We first derive the solution of VNO a’s revenue maximization problem, which will yield the
best response function Ba(wb). Since VNO s’s revenue is a concave function in VNO s’s strategies,
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem will give necessary and sufficient conditions for the revenue
maximizing weights. These conditions yield that the solution is at the upper boundary
∑
r∈B
ω
(r)
a = ha (13)
and that the following singular point condition must hold ∀r, q ∈ B
n(r)
(ω
(r)
a )
β−1(ω(r)b )
β
((ω
(r)
a )β + (ω
(r)
b )
β)2
= n(q)
(ω
(q)
a )
β−1(ω(q)b )
β
((ω
(q)
a )β + (ω
(q)
b )
β)2
. (14)
Similarly, for VNO b’s best response Bb(wa), the solution is at
∑
r∈B
ω
(r)
b = hb (15)
with the additional condition ∀r, q ∈ B
n(r)
(ω
(r)
b )
β−1(ω(r)a )β
((ω
(r)
a )β + (ω
(r)
b )
β)2
= n(q)
(ω
(q)
b )
β−1(ω(q)a )β
((ω
(q)
a )β + (ω
(q)
b )
β)2
. (16)
The Nash equilibrium is the intersection of Ba(wb) and Bb(wa), or equivalently, the solution
{w∗a , w∗b} to the system of (13)–(16).
4. Results and Discussion
In this section, the values for the weights, number of subscribers, VNO revenues and subscriber’s
rates are computed for the Nash equilibrium (although the asterisk is absent for lightening the notation)
that results from the competition described in Section 3.
We have performed the numerical computations of the solution of (13)–(16) for two cells,
hereafter referred to as I and II , but the conclusions can be extended for any number of cells, on the
basis of the analysis formulation made in Section 3. The values for the parameters used are displayed
in Table 1. This parameter setting illustrates a basic asymmetric scenario between two cells in terms of
capacity and of number of users.
Table 1. Parameter values for the numerical computations.
Parameter Value
α 2.0
cI 0.5
cII 1.5
nI 150.0
nII 50.0
p 1.0
Please note that the numerical computations performed are a numerical solving of the system of
Equations (13)–(16) in order to compute the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, these computations
are not to be implemented necessarily by the VNOs: microeconomics abstracts away these
implementation details. Our work may be extended, although it will be beyond the scope of this
paper, through formulating a hypothesis for the concrete operation of the market, ranging from the
nineteen-century Walras’ tattônement [24] to modern evolutionary-based explanations [25].
Electronics 2018, 7, 315 7 of 10
Figure 1 shows the weight assignment to the subscribers of each VNO at each cell, as a function
of VNO a’s share ha (VNO b’s share is 1− ha). As expected, the higher the share, the higher the
assigned weights. Furthermore, the dependence is linear. However, each VNO weights differently
its subscribers at each cell. In the parameter setting under study, each cell has a different capacity
and each cell covers different number of users. The fact that the capacities are different does not have
any influence, since according to (13)–(16), the weights do not depend on the value of the capacities.
However, the different number of users at each cell has an influence on the weights: the higher the
number of users at a cell, the higher the weights for the subscribers.
Figure 2 shows the number of subscribers for each VNO at each cell, as a function of VNO a’s
share ha. Again, the higher the share, the higher the number of subscribers. The number of subscribers
do not depend on the capacities, as (12) and the above discussion explains. However, the number of
subscribers does reflect the different number of users at each cell.
Since the VNO’s revenues at each cell are proportional to the number of subscribers, we only
represent the total revenue of each VNO (Figure 3), which shows that are increasing in its own share.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
ha
ω
(r
)
s
ωIa
ωIIa
ωIb
ωIIb
Figure 1. Weight assignment.
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Figure 2. Number of subscribers.
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Figure 3. Total VNO’s revenue.
Finally, we focus on the aggregate rate assignment that results from strategic slicing. Figure 4
shows this quantity, i.e., n(r)s r
(r)
s , divided by the cell capacity c(r), as a function of VNO a’s share ha.
We see that the following relationship holds: n(r)s r
(r)
s = hsc(r), s = a, b; r = I, II. This relationship means
that the InP performs a rate allocation that enforces each VNO share hs at each cell, which is a desirable
outcome from an engineering point of view. This result is surprising and is caused by the particular
weight allocation decision made by each VNO for each cell. Indeed, each VNO assigns a weight for its
subscribers that is independent from the cell capacity but dependent on the number of users at the cell.
This aggregate rate assignment is interesting because, first, the InP executes the rate allocation
following the instructions that each VNOs gives in their slice request, that is, the InP does not follow
any system-wide objective, but it merely acts as the agent of each VNO; second, the VNO share hs
of resources was agreed based on the total contribution of resources by each VNO, regardless of the
concrete contribution of resources at each cell (i.e., no VNO is excluded from any cell on the basis of
the previous ownership of the infrastructure); and third, each VNO is trying to maximize its revenue,
that is, takes a decision based only on its own incentives.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
ha
n(
r) s
r(
r) s
c(
r)
nIarIa
cI
nIIa rIIa
cII
nIbr
I
b
cI
nIIb r
II
b
cII
Figure 4. Aggregate rate over the cell capacity.
5. Conclusions
In this work, a business model is proposed and analyzed where the VNOs provide mobile
communications services to final users and provision themselves with resources from an InP by means
of network slicing mechanisms. The results show that the rate is allocated among the subscribers at
each cell in a way that mimics the overall share that each VNO is entitled to, and that this allocation is
the Nash equilibrium of the strategic slicing game between the VNOs. This allows us to conclude that
network sharing and slicing provides an attractive flexibility in the allocation of resources without the
need to enforce or control a policy through the InP.
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